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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

910190

v.
DAVID L. WORKMAN,
NITA WORKMAN,

Priority 14

Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants misinterpret the State's argument and the case
law.

The standard of review to be applied is correction of error

rather than abuse of discretion.

Case law requiring the jury to

exclude a reasonable hypotheses other than guilt does not support
the court of appeals ruling.

When the jury chose to disbelieve

defendants and make the reasonable inferences of guilty knowledge
from the circumstantial evidence, they had excluded all reasonable
alternatives other than guilt.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS MISAPPREHEND THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW.
In Point III of their brief, defendants state that the
standard of review for this Court is that "[t]he trial court's
order may be set aside only if it constitutes abuse of
discretion, and is presumed correct.
Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984)."

Corenevsky v. Superior

(Br. at 18). This is an

incorrect statement of the standard of review to be applied by
this Court,

A trial court may arrest judgment only if it can do

so as a matter of law.
1980).

State v. Myers. 606 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah

Consequently the trial court's order and the court of

appeals' decision were rulings on questions of law.

This Court

reviews questions of law for correctness and affords no deference
to the lower courts.

State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 19

n.3 (Utah 1991).
Defendants also assert that the State misunderstands a
critical difference between Myers and this case (Br. at 10) .
They argue that because there was no witness testifying directly
about their mental states, neither the trial court nor the court
of appeals could have disbelieved any witness that the jury
believed.

However, it is not the State's position that these

courts disbelieved a witness on the issue of defendant's
knowledge.

The State agrees that there was no witness who

directly testified that defendants knowingly consented to or
permitted Clinton Kelly's exploitation of their daughter.
Indeed, it would be unusual if the State were able to produce a
witness who could testify directly to the mental state of any
defendant.

See State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah

1983)(requisite mental state for crimes most frequently inferred
from circumstances).
The State's position is that the jury must have disbelieved the defendants' self-serving denials that they knowingly
consented to or permitted Kelly's exploitation of their daughter.
2

Conversely, the jury must have believed the circumstantial
evidence and made the reasonable inferences pointing to
defendants' knowledge of his actions.

Because the jury did not

accept defendants' testimony, the courts were not free to accept
it under the Myers standard.
Defendants appear to assert that the jury is not free
to disbelieve their testimony unless there is direct evidence
refuting it.

If this was the criterion for a criminal convic-

tion, few individuals would ever be convicted.

It is not unusual

for defendants to deny that they performed an act with the mental
state necessary to establish the act as a crime.

It is extremely

unusual, on the other hand, for any witness to be able to testify
that the defendant possessed a particular mental state.
Defendants also urge that it is crucial that Kelly and
defendants testified that defendants never saw the photograph
(exhibit 16) and that no witnesses testified that they saw it
(Br. at 13). This point is not as crucial as defendants contend.
The sexual exploitation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (1990),
does not require that the defendants see the finished product to
have knowingly consented to or permitted its production.

Thus,

the jury could have believed the witnesses on this point and
still have convicted defendants of sexual exploitation.
Additionally, defendants argue that circumstantial
evidence, to support a conviction, must exclude all other
reasonable hypotheses (Br. at 14, citing Watts, 675 P.2d at 569).
They contend that the lower court's ruling is supported by their
3

denials of guilt since no witnesses directly refuted them.

This

proposition is not as simplistic as defendants would have this
Court believe.

The Court has previously elaborated on the

concept:
It is true, as the defendant contends, that
where a conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, the evidence should be looked upon
with caution, and that it must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of
defendant. This is entirely logical, because
if the jury believes that there is a reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consistent
with the defendant's innocence, there would
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. Nevertheless, that proposition does
not apply to each circumstance separately,
but is a matter within the prerogative of the
jury to determine from all of the facts and
circumstances shown; and if therefrom they
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows
that they regarded the evidence as excluding
every other reasonable hypothesis.
State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1970) (footnote omitted).
In this case, the jury chose to disbelieve defendants' denials of
guilt, and chose to infer from circumstantial evidence that
defendants consented to or knowingly permitted Kelly's
exploitation of E.

Once the jury rejected defendants' claims of

ignorance, and embraced the inferences of defendants' knowledge,
they had excluded the only reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt.

Defendants may not parse the evidence and prevail by

relying on the lack of testimony directly refuting defendants'
claims of ignorance.
Finally, defendants refer to standards established by
the American Bar Association for directed verdicts and urges this
4

court to adopt these standards in Utah.

Defendants emphasize

that the ABA standard rejects the principle that the jury is the
exclusive judge of the evidence (Br. at 19). Significantly, in
this case, there was no directed verdict.

While the trial court

ordering a directed verdict is necessarily removing the case from
the jury, a Utah court is not allowed to disregard the jury
function and arrest judgment when there is evidence and
reasonable inferences which, if believed by the jury, supports
the verdict.

Myers, 606 P.2d at 251.

In order to apply the ABA

directed verdict standard in an arrest of judgment setting, this
Court would be required to overturn Myers and the longstanding,
well-accepted rule that the jury is the sole determiner of the
evidence.

This Court should not overturn this well-established

principle that is integral to the criminal law of this State.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State again requests this
Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
reinstate the jury verdict.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
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day of December,

1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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